Radical Artificial Intelligence: A Postmodern Approach by Blank, Doug
Bryn Mawr College
Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr
College
Computer Science Faculty Research and
Scholarship Computer Science
1999
Radical Artificial Intelligence: A Postmodern
Approach
Doug Blank
Bryn Mawr College, dblank@brynmawr.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.brynmawr.edu/compsci_pubs
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. http://repository.brynmawr.edu/compsci_pubs/24
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.
Custom Citation
Blank, D.S. (1999). The Radical Alternative to Hybrid Systems. In A. Jagota, T. Plate, L. Shastri, R. Sun (eds), Connectionist Symbol
Processing: Dead or Alive?, 1-40, a collective article in Neural Computing Surveys.
1Connectionist Symbol Processing: Dead or Alive?
Contributors
D. S. Blank, M. Coltheart, J. Diederich, B.M. Garner, R.W. Gayler, C.L. Giles,
L. Goldfarb, M. Hadeishi, B. Hazlehurst, M. J. Healy, J. Henderson, N. G. Jani,
D. S. Levine, S. Lucas, T. Plate, G. Reeke, D. Roth, L. Shastri,
J. Sougne, R. Sun, W. Tabor, B. B. Thompson, S. Wermter
Editors Arun Jagota, Tony Plate, Lokendra Shastri, Ron Sun
Producers Arun Jagota, Nigel Duy
Preface
In August 1998 Dave Touretzky asked on the connectionists e-mailing list, \Is connectionist symbol pro-
cessing dead?". This started a debate, and much interesting discussion followed. We thought it might be
helpful to capture the spirit and ideas of the debate into an article. Contributions were solicited, and this
collective article is the product.
Contributions were solicited by a public call on the connectionists e-mailing list. All received pieces
were subjected to two to three minireviews. Almost all were accepted; about half after (varying extents of)
revision.
The article appears to contain a good sample of the work in the eld (judging by the number and variety
of contributions, and by the number of references). However one cannot be certain that all major eorts
have been collected.
The pieces in this article are of varying nature: position summaries, individual research summaries,
historical accounts, discussion of controversial issues, etc. No attempt was made to connect up the various
pieces, nor to organize them in a coherent order. Despite this, we think the reader will nd this collection
useful.
The Radical Alternative to Hybrid Systems
Douglas S. Blank
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, USA, dblank@comp.uark.edu
Implementing symbol processing in networks was a good rst step in solving many problems that plagued
symbolic systems. Tony Plate's HRR as applied to analogy is a great example [147]. Using connectionist
representations and methodologies, an expensive symbolic similarity estimation process was eliminated in
the analogy-making MAC/FAC system [60].
Unfortunately, the entire MAC/FAC hybrid model (like many such models) has a fatal aw that prevents
it from leading to an autonomous, exible, creative, intelligent (analogy-making) machine: the overall system
organization is still rigidly \symbolic". Their method requires that analogies be encoded as symbols and
structures, which leaves no room for perception or context eects during the analogy making process (for a
detailed description of this problem, see Hofstadter [86]). For these reasons, implementing Gentner's rigid
framework completely in a neural network (or even real neurons) won't help.
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Plate's hybrid solution, like most hybrid systems, solved many problems of the MAC/FAC purely-
symbolic system. No doubt, hybrid systems are better than their symbolic relatives. However, wherever
symbols and structures remain, we seem to be faced with other problems of brittleness and rigidity.
I believe that in order to tackle the big unsolved AI and cognitive science problems (like making analogies),
we, as modelers, will have to face a radical idea: we will no longer understand how our models solve a problem
exactly. I mean that, for many complex problems, systems that solve them won't be able to be broken down
into symbols and modules, and, therefore, there may not be a description of the solution more abstract than
the actual solution itself.
This is a radical view that many researchers would argue against. Istvan S. N. Berkeley sums up this
opposition in the Connectionists mailing list:
\It seems to me that there is something fundamentally wrong about the proposal here. As
McCloskey [130] has argued, unless we can develop an understanding of how network models
(or any kind of model for that matter) go about solving problems, they will not have any useful
impact upon cognitive theorizing. Whilst this may not be a problem for those who wish to
use networks merely as a technology, it surely must be a concern to those who wish to deploy
networks in the furtherment of cognitive science. If we follow [Blank's suggestion] then even
successful attempts at modelling will be theoretically sterile, as we will be creating nothing more
than `black boxes'."
It is true: if we follow this radical view, we will end up creating \black boxes" or, more radically, the
\Big Black Box" solution. However, it is not true that we will be left with a \theoretically sterile" science
of cognition. Instead of \theories" that explain \how it works" at a ne level, we will have explanations of
\how it developed" at a coarse level. Such a theory would look very dierent from, say, Marr's theory of
vision [127].
Many researchers have been focusing on such explanations by attempting to solve high-level problems via
a purely connectionist framework. Some high-level systems that come to mind include Elman's developmental
models, Meeden's planning system, and my own connectionist analogy-making system [43, 133, 20]. Rather
than focusing on some assumed-necessary symbolically-based process (say, variable binding) these models
look at a bigger goal: modeling a complex behavior.
My analogical model does not assume that analogies are correspondences made via searching through
symbolic structures. Rather, a network is trained to recognize similar parts of images or sets of relations.
The goal of the project was to see how far we can currently model a seemingly symbolic high-level behavior
without resorting to the traditional symbolic assumptions.
Of course, many systems cannot be \black boxes". Military systems, or modules that interface with other
subsystems may need to harness the explanative power and structure of symbolic systems. But the general
cognitive scientist seeking the most intelligent, autonomous articial agents possible need not be constrained
in such a way. For us, there is the radical alternative.
Therefore, building and manipulating structured representations or binding variables via networks should
not be our goal. Neither should creating a model such that we can understand its inner workings. Rather,
we should focus on the techniques that allow a system to self-organize such that it can solve the bigger
problems. Much of the research on \learning to learn" is, I believe, related to this issue.
Connectionist symbol processing has no doubt created more robust symbolic systems; connectionism has
shown that it can be used as an engineering tool to create more exible, less brittle symbolic processing.
However, for me, \connectionist symbol processing" was just a very useful stage I went through as a cognitive
scientist. Now I see that networks can do the equivalent of processing symbols, and not have anything to
do with symbols. In addition, I learned that I can let go of the notion that I will understand exactly how a
network does it.
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Connectionism, Commerce and Cognition
Max Coltheart
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, max@currawong.bhs.mq.edu.au
There are at least four distinct spheres of endeavour in which one could seek evidence of successes in
connectionist symbol processing. Because great success in any one of these spheres by no means guarantees
any success at all in the others, we need to examine each separately.
The rst of these spheres is the commercial. Connectionist networks have been applied to many problems
of commercial interest - handwriting recognition, voice recognition, predicting the stock market - and it
would be of interest to survey such applications to assess the degree to which they have been commercially
successful.
The second domain is the formal theory of neural networks, which I take to be a branch of mathematics.
This is concerned with proving theorems dealing with such matters as the particular types of symbol-
processing problems which particular learning algorithms can or cannot learn. I don't think anyone would
dispute the claim that we know far more about such matters now than we did twenty years ago.
Neither of these two domains of applicability of connectionism has anything to do with symbol-processing
as it is carried out by living organisms, of course; however, the other two domains I discuss are concerned
with this.
The third domain is the brain. Connectionist networks are often referred to as neural networks of course,
and much connectionist research results in statements about brain function. What have we learned about
how the brain processes symbols by doing connectionism instead of, for example, doing single-cell recording
or psychopharmacology? This is far from clear, in my opinion, because much work of this kind argues in
the following way: we know that the brain is a neural network, and the formal theory of neural networks
tells us a great deal about what neural nets can and cannot do, and how they do what they do; therefore
connectionism tells us a great deal about what the brain can and cannot do, and how it does what it does.
Of course, the word "neural" in "the brain is a neural network" and the word "neural" in "the formal theory
of neural networks" refer to quite dierent things. Nevertheless, one comes across arguments that do seem
to take this form - for example, arguments to the eect that since formal neural networks are susceptible
to catastrophic interference, the brain needs some way of avoiding such this problem, and that means that
connectionism tells us what the hippocampus is for. This doesn't follow, because it doesn't follow that
catastrophic interference must be a problem for the brain if it is a problem for formal neural networks.
Which brings us to the nal domain, the mind - the functional or information-processing level of explana-
tion of symbol processing.A major contribution that springs to mind here is the Interactive Activation Model
(IAM) of letter and word recognition [129]. It oered an excellent quantitative account of a body of data
from studies of word and letter perception; and it remains inuential, since two contemporary computational
models of word recognition [35, 67] are directly derived from the IAM model. Why, then, in the extensive
discussion of connectionist symbol processing did no one oer the IAM as an example of a success in this
eld? This can't be because the IAM doesn't have anything to do with symbol processing, since letters
and words are, obviously, symbols. So is the IAM not regarded as a connectionist model? It is hard to
see why it doesn't qualify here, since the model consists of three layers of units which communicate with
each other via excitatory and inhibitory connections. However,I suggest that this kind of model is regarded
as nonconnectionist because of two of its properties. The rst is that it uses local rather than distributed
representation. The second is that its connection strengths are hardwired by the modellers, not learned via
some learning algorithm. If I am right about this, then I conclude that our debate about connectionism and
symbol processing has really been a debate about whether symbol processing can be done well by systems
that use distributed representations and by systems that are trained by one of the usual learning algorithms
(which sounds like two debates rather than one).
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Connectionist Symbol Processing: Is There an Ecient Mapping of
Feedforward Networks To a Set of Rules?
Joachim Diederich
Queensland University of Technology, Australia, joachim@moon.t.qut.edu.au
Dave Touretzky asked about the current state of connectionist symbol processing in light of the fact \that
we did not have good techniques for dealing with structured information in distributed form, or for doing
tasks that require variable binding." Consequently, a number of contributors (e.g. Feldman, Shastri, Plate
and others) have focused on rule-based or symbolic processing in neural networks. Rule-extraction from
trained neural networks is a side-issue in this context. The objective is to eciently map a neural network
to a set of (minimal rules); the neural network as such is not used for rule-based processing. However, if it is
possible to map a feedforward NN to a rule-set in polynomial time, then this is relevant for the current debate.
For instance, it would shed new light on discussions such as the learning of the past-tense of English verbs
and to what degree rule-based behavior emerges from feedforward networks. Since the underlying processing
mechanism cannot be observed but must be inferred from empirical data for most cognitive tasks, knowledge
of an ecient mapping of a feedforward network to a set of rules that closely approximate the behavior of
the network is relevant. It not only touches the question of the appropriate level of abstraction for cognitive
modeling but it makes certain questions (Is the underlying mechanism NN or rule-based?) almost impossible
to answer. If the brain or any other computational system can eciently map one representation (a neural
network) into another (a set of rules), then it is close to impossible to infer the correct representation from
empirical data.
Over the last years, the principal capabilities and limitations of the most important rule-extraction from
NN techniques have been studied analytically (with respect to the computational complexity) and experi-
mentally. Furthermore, rule-extraction from NN techniques have been compared with inductive inference
methods (again, theoretically and by experiment). Noisy and incomplete data sets have been used for bench-
marks in order to determine the suitability of these algorithms for real-world applications. The following is
a brief summary of some relevant results:
Theory
Golea [66] showed that extracting the minimum DNF expression from a trained feedforward net is hard in
the worst case. Furthermore, Golea [66] showed that the Craven & Shavlik [37] algorithm is not polynomial
in the worst case. A promising approach is extracting the best rule, within a given class of rules, from single
perceptrons. However, extracting the best N-of-M rule from a single-layer network is again hard. Maire [123]
presents a method to unify rules extracted by use of the N-of-M technique. Independently, he shows that
deciding whether a perceptron is symmetric with respect to two variables is NP-complete.
More recently Maire [124] introduced an algorithm for inverting the function realised by a feedforward
network based on the inversion of the vector-valued functions computed by each individual layer. This
new rule-extraction algorithm backpropagates regions from the output to the input layer. These regions
are nite unions of polyhedra; applied over the input space they approximate to a user- dened level of
accuracy the true reciprocal image of constraints on the outputs (similar to Validity Interval Analysis). A
core problem of the rule-extraction task is thereby solved. The method can be applied to all feedforward
networks independent of input-output representations.
Empirical studies
A number of rule-extraction from trained neural networks techniques have been compared by use of the
standard benchmark data sets. In addition, rule-extraction from neural network techniques have been
compared with symbolic machine learning methods. Good results have been reported for decompositional
technique wrt. rule-quality. Results are generally poorer for pedagogical, learning-based techniques [8].
Neural Computing Surveys, cas, 1-40, 1999, http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~jagota/NCS 5
Symbols, Symbolic Processing and Neural Networks
B. M. Garner
RMIT, Melbourne, Australia, bmg@cs.rmit.edu.au
This contribution poses questions in an attempt to clarify the issues involved in symbolic processing and
hypotheses are made as to the answers of these questions. These questions being, what is \symbol", what
is \symbolic processing", and where does symbolic processing occur within the brain? Currently available
training algorithms will train neural networks as sets of constraints and it is seen that this is consistent with
the denition of symbol proposed here. The proposed denition of symbol is `symbol is something that takes
its meaning from those symbols \around" it'. Also when the right preprocessing on input data is done, even
very complex problems can be learnt easily.
The Denition of symbol
When looking at symbols they are always dened in terms of relationships to other symbols, and that symbols
do not occur by themselves. Often symbols are imbedded into other symbols, and can be used and reused
and take their meaning only within the context they are found in. So perhaps the best denition of symbol
is that `symbol is something that takes its meaning from those symbols \around" it'. Perhaps there are
better denitions because this one is self-referential. However, this idea of symbol is close to that proposed
by structural linguistics (de Saussure [38], Leach [112], Levi-Strauss [113]).
While there may be some debate over a connectionist denition of what a symbol is, there needs to
be some denition. Finding an adequate denition may not be easy as there is much debate from many
disciplines, so it may be best to propose something and see how useful it is.
Symbolic Processing
Symbolic processing is where the symbols are either learnt so that they can be recalled at another time,
or classied as having previously been learnt. This is referred to as learning/classication process in this
contribution.
Two training algorithms for feedforward neural networks were published by Garner [56, 57], where
the network was said to be trained to a symbolic solution because numeric values for the weights and the
thresholds are not found. The network is trained into sets of constraints for each 'neuron' in the hidden and
output layers. The constraints show that the weights and the thresholds are in relationship to each other at
each 'neuron' [55]. This relationship is comparative, hence each weight or threshold takes its meaning from
the weights in the neuron is belongs to. The proposed denition of symbol supports the results of available
training algorithms [56, 57].
The constraints can be seen to dene logic relationships within the neuron, then together with the other
neurons in the trained network, form larger logic relationships. So after the network has been trained to
learn a problem, it is possible to see how the network is structured to learn the symbols that the network is
being trained to recognise.
Symbolic Input and Output
Before symbolic processing can take place within the network of neurons, the input has to be transformed
into a form suitable for processing.
Input is presented to the brain in the form of sense data via the nervous system. This input can be viewed
as a symbol. What is meant by this, is that the sensation of that which is being touched, for instance, is
encoded and presented to the brain via nerve endings, and that sensation is the symbol, as it represents
the object being touched. A similar process is occurring for all the senses the symbol encoding transforms
the sensation to a format suitable for the brain to be classied or learnt; another example is the visual
alphanumeric symbol 'a' which is distinct from the audible alphanumeric symbol 'a' have to somehow be
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translated into the same abstract symbol. Hence, the input is encoded and transformed into an abstract
format that allows the information to be learnt and compared with other symbols.
This problem of transforming data to a format suitable to be learnt by an ANN is familiar to people who
have trained a number of them. Even dicult problems such as the twin spiral problem can be learnt with
one hidden layer if the input space is very well understood and abstracted appropriately for learning.
It would seem that some similar transformation, as in symbol input, takes place after classication/learning
or symbolic processing for the purposes of thought, communication, action, and so on.
Conclusions
This has been an attempt clarifying the issues involved in symbolic processing, if connectionism is to seriously
address this problem. It has been proposed that there are several mechanisms occurring, a number of very
good transformation processes, and probably one very general learning process that will learn practically
anything in a binary format.
Holographic Networks are Hiking the Foothills of Analogy
Ross W. Gayler
University of Melbourne, Australia, r.gayler@psych.unimelb.edu.au
Dave Touretzky asked whether connectionist symbol processing is dead. In expanding on this question he
made the following observations: (i) \The problems of structured representations and variable binding have
remained unsolved.", (ii) \The last really signicant work in the area was Tony Plate's holographic reduced
representations", and (iii) \No one is trying to build distributed connectionist reasoning systems any more,
like the connectionist production system I built."
With respect to the rst observation, I am not sure which problems Dave is referring to, but the funda-
mental problem of whether structured representations and variable binding are possible in a connectionist
system was answered in the armative by Paul Smolensky [179]. His tensor product binding method al-
lows arbitrary vectors to be bound to other vectors, implementing variable/value bindings and recursively
composed structures. The method deals with fully distributed representations of bindings and handles local
representations as special cases.
If the vectors being composed are chosen randomly they may be interpreted as symbols, in that they are
eectively discrete because of the distribution of similarities of randomly chosen high-dimensional vectors.
However, where the vectors to be composed are not chosen randomly the resultant similarity structure
between the token vectors may carried over into the recursively composed structures, generalising them to
continuous structures.
Smolensky's work covered both the mathematical structure of the representations and the operations that
could be carried out on them. These operations included holistic transformations of recursive structures
and multiple superposed structures. Thus, these structures may be transformed in a single step without
sequentially unpacking them.
The beauty of tensor product binding compared to more typically connectionist techniques for producing
structured representations (e.g. RAAM, Pollack [153]) is that iterative weight learning is not required. The
binding properties arise directly from the architecture rather than an optimisation algorithm. New bindings
may be constructed in a single time step and used immediately. This makes practical the creation and use
of ephemeral cognitive structures.
I agree with Dave's second observation on the signicance of Tony Plate's contribution. The major
practical problems with Smolensky's tensor product binding are that the required vector dimension increases
exponentially with the nesting depth of the structure to be represented and signicant book-keeping is
required to track the ordering of dimensions. Tony Plate overcame these problems with Holographic Reduced
Representations (1994) [148]. HRRs can be viewed as compressed tensor products. They provide similar
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representational capabilities to tensor product binding, but have the remarkable practical advantage that a
compositional structure occupies only as much representational space as an individual constituent. (Pollack's
RAAM provides the same space saving, but at the cost of weight learning.)
To the best of my knowledge there are only a few people working actively with HRRs or closely related
systems: Tony Plate, Pentti Kanerva, Ross Gayler, and Chris Eliasmith. Plate and Eliasmith work with
HRRs. Kanerva's spatter-coding and Gayler's multiplicative binding are very closely related to each other
and are members of the compressed tensor product family (as are HRRs). The apparently low rate of
progress in this area is at least partly due to the low number of active researchers. However, I believe the
area has gone (relatively) quiet because the research has moved into a qualitatively dierent phase. The
work of Smolensky and Plate demonstrated that practical, connectionist, recursive structures are feasible.
Now the focus has shifted to how these methods may be used to implement cognitive operations.
\No one is trying to build distributed connectionist reasoning systems any more, like the connectionist
production system Touretzky and Hinton [200] built". This work was an important demonstration of tech-
nical capability and an implementation of a well understood symbolic architecture. The researchers working
with the compressed tensor product family are attempting to develop connectionist architectures that take
advantage of the unique strengths of the representations to implement cognitive operations. By denition,
they are not seeking to implement known symbolic architectures. Thus, they have taken on the slow and
dicult task of simultaneously developing novel models of cognitive processes and implementing them in
novel ways.
Plate, Kanerva, and Gayler were all present at the Analogy'98 workshop in Soa [58, 59, 98, 150]. They
believe that analogy is central to human thought and that analogical mapping may be more easily imple-
mented with compressed tensor product techniques than classical symbolic techniques because systematic
substitution of terms is eectively a primitive operation in their systems. Eliasmith has worked on a dis-
tributed model of analogical mapping, reimplementing the Holyoak and Thagard [87] ACME model using
HRRs . Accounts of Eliasmith's work are available from http://ascc.artsci.wustl.edu/~ celiasmi.
Returning to Touretzky's original question, this particular branch of connectionist symbol processing is
not dead. It is in the early phase of striking out in a new direction.
Symbolic Methods in Neural Networks
C. Lee Giles
NEC Research Institute, USA, giles@research.nj.nec.com
What is often not realized is that symbolic methods, especially automata, and neural networks share
a long history. The rst work on neural networks and automata (actually sequential machines - automata
implementations), was that of McCulloch and Pitts [131]. Surprisingly, it has also been referenced as the
rst paper on nite-state automata (FSA) [88], on Articial Intelligence (Boden), and on recurrent neural
networks (RNNs) [62]. In addition, the recurrent network (with instantaneous feedback) in the second
part of this paper was then reinterpreted by Kleene [101] as a FSA in \Representation of Events in Nerve
Nets and Finite Automata", published in the edited book \Automata Studies" by Shannon and McCarthy.
Sometimes this paper is cited as the rst article on nite state machines [143]. Minsky [134] discusses
symbolic computation in the form of automata with neural networks both in his dissertation and in his
book \Computation: Finite and Innite Machines" which has a chapter on \Neural Networks: Automata
Made up of Parts." All of the early work referenced above assumes that the neuron's activation function is
hard-thresholded, not a \soft" sigmoid.
All of the early work on automata and neural networks was concerned with automata synthesis, i.e.
how automata are built or designed into neural networks. Because most automata when implemented as a
sequential machine requires feedback, the neural networks were necessarily recurrent ones (for an exception
see Clouse [25]). It's important to note that the early work (with the exception of Minsky) did not often
make a clear distinction between automata (directed, labeled, acyclic graphs [sometimes with stacks and
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tapes]) and sequential machines (logic and feedback delays) and was mostly concerned with FSA. There was
little interest with the exception of Minsky in moving up the automata hierarchy to pushdown automata
and Turing Machines.
One important area in which symbolic methods have recently been used in neural networks is that of
representation, i.e. theoretically what computational structures neural networks are provably equivalent or
not equivalent to. (The earliest recent work in the area seems to be Pollack [151].) Not surprisingly, all neural
network architectures do not have the same computational power. Siegelmann [177, 176] proves that some
recurrent network architectures are at least Turing equivalent while Frasconi [49] shows the computational
limitations of a local RNN architecture. Giles [61] and Kremer [104] show that certain growing methods
can be computationally limited. There has also been specic work on automata representation in neural
networks, see for example, Casey [23] (convergence of FSA extraction), Omlin et al [138] (also a comparison
of the complexity of many encoding methods and an extension of work by Alon [7]), Frasconi [50] (radial basis
functions), Maass [122] (spiked neurons). This type of work is continuing in other computation structures,
examples being graphs and tree grammars (Frasconi et al [51], Sperduti [187]) and is important for broadening
the scope and power of neural computing systems.
\The Tragedy" of Connectionist Symbol Processing
Lev Goldfarb
University of New Brunswick, Canada, goldfarb@unb.ca
About 8-9 years ago, soon after the birth of the connectionists mailing list, there was a discussion
somewhat related to the present one (about the state of connectionist symbol processing). I recall stating, in
essence, that the \connectionist symbol processing" destroys most of the class information contained in the
symbolic training set, if the symbolic representation{and therefore the corresponding \symbolic operations"{
are to be taken seriously. This point appears to be not an obvious one. Why?
I believe that the situation is mainly explained by the fact that in mathematics the concept of symbolic
representation has not yet been addressed, simply because no classical application areas have lead to it.
Probably as a result, one \forgets" that the connectionist representation space{the vector space over the
reals{by its very denition (via the two operations, vector addition and scalar multiplication) allows one \to
see" only the compositions of the two mentioned operations and practically no \symbolic operations", e.g.
various deletion, insertion and substitution operations on strings.
From a formal point of view, it is important to keep in mind that each of the latter \symbolic operations"
is a multivalued function dened on the set of strings over a nite alphabet (e.g. a may occur in many places
in the same string).
In other words, if, for example, we encode the strings over a nite alphabet by vectors in a nite-
dimensional vector space over the reals and try to recover any original symbolic \operation", e.g. \insertion
of abcacc", using only the operations of the vector space or even, additionally, any xed in advance nite
set of non-linear functions, we see that without \cheating", i.e. without looking \back" at the symbolic
operation itself, this is impossible.
The relevance of the last observation becomes more clear when, by analogy with the numeric case, one
begins to view the inductive learning process in a symbolic environment as that of discovering the optimal
(w.r.t. the training set) symbolic distance measure, where these distance measures are now dened via the
dynamically updated set of weighted symbolic operations [64].
In such a \symbolic" framework, in contrast to the classical numeric framework, the discovered operations
of weight 0, i.e. those corresponding to the some \important class features", induce on the symbolic space
topology that is quite dierent from the unique topology of the nite-dimensional vector space.
In fact, it turns out that in a sense the symbolic representational bias is substantially more general than
the numeric bias. Put dierently, for practical purposes, the normed vector space is a very special case of
the more general \symbolic space".
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It should be pointed out that the basic \computer science" concept of abstract data type, or ADT, also
strongly suggests to view the \dierences" between the structured objects in term of the corresponding set
of operations.
Some idea about the advantages of the \symbolic spaces" over the classical numeric spaces can, perhaps,
be gleaned by comparing the known \numeric" solutions of the generalized parity problem, the problem
quite notorious within the connectionist community, with the following, \symbolic", solution (the learning
algorithm is omitted).
THE PARITY CLASS PROBLEM
The alphabet: A = fa; bg.
Input set S (i.e. the input space without the distance function):
The set of strings over A.
The parity class C: The set of strings with an even number of b's.
Example of a positive training set C
+
:
aababbbaabbaa
baabaaaababa
abbaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
bbabbbbaaaaabab
aaa
Solution to the parity problem, i.e. inductive (parity) class representation:
One element from C
+
, e.g. aaa, plus the following 3 weighted operations (note that the sum of the
weights is 1)
deletion/insertion of a (weight 0)
deletion/insertion of b (weight 1)
deletion/insertion of bb (weight 0)
This means, in particular, that the distance function D between any two strings from the input set S is
now dened as the shortest weighted path (generated by the above 3 operations) between these strings. The
class is now dened as the set of all strings in the space (S;D) whose distance from aaa is 0.
On Connectionist Symbol Processing and the Question of A Natural
Representational Ontology
Mitsuharu Hadeishi
Open Mind Research, mitsu@openmind.com
Some people claim that the fact that the input space to a connectionist or connectionist-style architecture
can be represented as an n-tuple of values (which can be naturally interpreted as a Euclidean vector space)
by itself provides sucient evidence to shed signicant doubt on the ability of connectionist architectures to
develop or learn to deal with symbolic representations or symbolic problems. This is questionable for a variety
of reasons, most notably because the input space may be mapped through what amounts to an arbitrary
dierentiable function approximator (i.e , a connectionist or connectionist-style architecture) [54, 89] which
allow these kinds of systems to construct new models [154] and distort the original metric arbitrarily to bias
it in favor of particular learning tasks [16, 17]. The learning process depends on the entire architecture of
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the network and the denition of the whole algorithm. In other words, the metric structure of the input
space considered on its own does not need to be a signicant factor when it comes to evaluating whether
or not connectionism is capable of symbolic processing|in any case, one cannot evaluate the potential
ecacy of the learning algorithm on the basis of just this. In addition, though xed-dimensional, xed-
precision representations cannot handle arbitrarily recursive structures (with the point raised by Tony Plate
that allowing bags of multiple xed-dimensional, xed-precision vector space representations such as his
Holographic Reduced Representations [148, 145] can encode arbitrarily nested structure, and others have
noted xed-dimensional, innite-precision vectors can be used in the same way, for example Jordan Pollack's
RAAMs [152]), this does not prevent you from using sequential-in-time representations, for example, in
conjunction with recurrent networks (which can emulate any Turing machine in theory [177]).
While using symbolic representations can certainly lead to faster solutions to symbolic problems [164], it
is not clear that this is the most general way to approach all problems. In other words, the representation
and the bias imposed by a given representation can lead to enhancements in the eciency of a learning
algorithm for a given problem domain, but a symbolic or any other specic representation is not necessarily
an ecient representation for every problem domain|in fact, it seems obvious that this is not the case.
In addition, one can conceive of connectionist and neural architectures which use both distributed and
symbolic representations [212, 213]. Perhaps metaphorical reasoning requires this sort of exibility (for
example, attempting to understand poetic expressions).
In general, the notion that there is a single preferred ontology for all representational problems is a highly
suspect one. While it is clear that symbolic ontologies (for example) have power (particularly due to their
ability to be recursively recombined [148, 145, 152]), nevertheless they evolved over a very long time [128].
To say they are best a priori seems contradictory, since symbolic forms of representation have obviously
not always existed and many other representations have also been used and are still being used, and there
is no particular reason to think any specic representation is the \only" or \best" natural representation
for all problems [82, 83]. While it is a seductive goal to try to nd one ideal representation/ontology, the
fact is that in nature, you can think of representations as stable basis elements used by feedback systems
[14, 15] (i.e., during the interaction between an organism and its environment, stable patterns can evolve
naturally|whatever works|as the organism interacts with its environment, or the organism attempts to
regulate its own processes, these representations may be symbolic or not, as needed [137]). To speak of a
single \best" representation is to ignore this fundamental aspect of what a representation is and to treat
observations as though they were being carried out by some disembodied abstract entity that exists outside of
a physical system or feedback loop: but there is no abstract \observation" or \observer", only the workings
of a physical system [48]. Since there is no abstract entity called \an observation" being \made" by a
disembodied \observer object", you have to look at the whole system (including both observer and observed)
in order to interpret the representation (i.e., the information in the signal) whether the representation is
symbolic, distributed, temporal, spatial, local, or something else. To be more concrete: a symbol on a page
or an activation level of a neuron is meaningless in and of itself; it is only meaningful in the context of the
system of which it is a part, and thus it is the properties of the whole system which determine the natural
biases (and thus the bases) and generate the natural representation for the system.
Connectionist Research On The Problem Of Symbols: An Opportunity To
Recast How Symbols Work By Reconsidering The Boundaries Of Cognitive
Systems
Brian Hazlehurst
University of California, San Diego, USA, briahn@shn.net
In a recent response to David Touretsky's inquiry about the state of the art in connectionist symbol
processing, Doug Blank raises some good points about cognition and how we should study it.
One I agree with is:
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Building and manipulating structured representations or binding variables via networks should
not be our goals.
One I am neutral about is:
Neither should creating a model such that we can understand its inner workings [be one of
our goals].
Another I agree with is:
Rather, we should focus on the techniques that allow a system to self-organize such that it
can solve The Bigger Problems.
However, it is precisely awareness of The Bigger Problems that have focused people's attention on symbols
and human abilities in processing symbols. I share the views expressed above, but also believe that the
\problem of symbols" is core to The Bigger Problems. So what is a way around this apparent paradox?
One way is to recognize that \connectionist research on the problem of symbols" is not the same thing
as \connectionist symbol processing". The latter type of research often casts the problem as one of mim-
icking the computational properties of symbols in a direct way: value-binding, compositional structure,
systematicity, etc.
However, while each of these properties must hold at some level of description, and for some stage of
development of the cognitive system, they need not apply at every level of description of that system nor
for all time that the system exists. That is, these properties need not be atomic primitives of the system for
them to play the roles that they do in the system.
For instance the properties of compositionality and systematicity so often used to describe natural lan-
guage, are often taken as basic primitives of human language. Dening the system in this way leads us to
build these properties into the primitives of our computational framework for modelling the phenomena {
witness the Language of Thought model [47] which underlies the symbolic framework. (The framework, in
turn, receives credit for being an \inspectable innner workings" methodology. A nice convenience perhaps,
but certainly nature is not in the business of creating methodological conveniences.)
One real contribution of connectionism has been the introduction of a modelling framework which doesn't
require us to make this commitment to building observed properties of the cognitive system into the primitives
of the framework. By taking more seriously the micro-level structure and processing, we also have had an
opportunity to reconstruct the appropriate boundaries of the cognitive system. In order to account for the
properties of symbols and symbol-processing, I believe, this means considering the interactions among people
and the environments they co-habit in performing cognitive work. In so reconstituting the boundary of the
cognitive system, the required properties of symbols may well emerge from, rather than be primitives of,
individual brains.
To return to the example of natural language, the challenge is to determine how agents who share a
world and a set of tasks which must get accomplished in that world can employ a communication medium
to facilitate the job. Furthermore, we wish to address the important question: can the medium support the
complex properties found in natural language? Can such an arrangement, exhibiting the powers of symbol
processing, exist without symbol systems being enscripted in the wetware?
Research addressing these questions is a line of work that Edwin Hutchins and I have pursued in col-
laboration for several years [93, 94, 74] . Our models entail demonstrations which answer these particular
questions in the armative. For instance, we have shown how sharing of lexical items need not preceed the
task of communication if the full cognitive system (vocal/gesture plus perception plus social commitment) is
recognized and modelled. We have also demonstrated that a compositional communication system is readily
achieved by agents which must negotiate the formation of the system, while individual verbalizers of inner
organization fail to create compositional systems. This robust result follows from the fact that individual
creators' verbalizations (in our simulations) never have to do any communicative work, and thus never get
exploited in production of higher order structure { such as a grammar which serves to encourage expected
constructions.
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This work has anities to other connectionist work in language acquisition [24] and symbol-grounding [72,
73, 36] , and is informed by a line of philosophical thinking about lanuguage which stems from Wittegen-
stein [105, 19, 45]. Our work has its roots in Cognitive Anthropology, where the organization of behavior is
what needs to be explained and the basic data are the trac in material exchanges (including language and
gesture) which evoke and create meanings. However, given the broad array of documented ways in which
organized behavior comes about through cultural processes, we pay attention (as do all anthropologists) to
the inter-personal and historical aspects of cognitive systems.
To summarize, I agree with Doug Blank that connectionism needs to go beyond the framing of the
agenda which has been inherited from symbolic theorizing and modelling. However, I also believe that crucial
issues of The Big Problems will continue to be derived from the nature of symbols and symbol processing.
My solution for how to meet both of these (seemingly at-odds) requirements lies with understanding that
symbol processing is signicantly informed by the domains of person-environment, person-person and across-
generation phenomena.
Formal Semantic Model for Neural Networks
Michael J. Healy
The Boeing Company, University of Washington, USA, michael.j.healy@boeing.com
Understanding the semantic issues involved in symbolic processing with neural networks requires a math-
ematical approach, to disambiguate the terminology and understand the relationship between symbols, con-
nectionist processing, and data. Rule extraction is one example of an active literature involving symbolic
processing with neural networks. This work is mostly empirical, with formal modeling considered only infre-
quently (see [9] for an overview of the eld and the issues most often addressed). A mathematical model for
the semantics of symbolic processing with neural networks requires more than a stated symbolic representa-
tion of connectionist processing and connection weight memories: It requires an explicit semantic model as
well. In such a model, the "universe" of things the symbolic concepts are about receives as much attention
as the concepts themselves.
For example, if the concepts are descriptions of airplane part assemblies (fuselage, right engine, landing
gear, landing gear strut, landing gear hydraulic uid line, ...), then there are dierent examples of each
concept|say, for a Boeing 747 or Airbus 320. An example can be represented in the mathematical model
as a "point" in a space of airplane assemblies. Each point is associated with a set of concepts, representing
what is known about that point.
A mathematical modeling eort in progress[75] has resulted in a statement about some important logical
properties of rule bases in general and rule extraction with neural networks and other machine learning
systems in particular. The main nding in this eort to date is that a sound and complete rule base|one
in which the rules are actually valid for all the data and which has all the rules|has the semantics of a
continuous function between topological spaces. The concepts of each space are associated with the open
sets, and the things the concepts are about (such as the airplane assemblies in the example) are the points.
The reference previously given discusses this, with some explanation. A more extensive development will be
available in a forthcoming paper[76].
The mathematical semantic model referred to here is based upon geometric logic and its semantics.
The initial version of the semantics is expressed in terms of point-set topology. This is the simple version;
geometric logic is really a categorical logic, and category theory has a much greater expressive power.
Geometric logic is very strict in what it takes to assert a statement. It is meant to represent observational
statements, ones whose positive instances can be observed. Topology is the mathematical study of \nearness";
the connection with logic is that an instance of the \universe of discouse" satises a collection of logical
statements that are related through logical inference; conversely, the instances of related statements satisfy a
\similarity" or \nearness" relationship. Continuous functions between dierent universes (or sub-universes,
called domains) preserve these similarity relationships. Continuity is really the mathematical way of saying
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"similar things map to similar things".
In terms of the previous example, in which airplane parts are points in a space, an important kind
of similarity arises. To exemplify, one point might represent a left-side landing gear strut for a 320, but
that might be all that is known about it. Alternatively, more could be known: It could be known that it
comes from a particular airplane, \tail number such-and-such" (the airplane's unique ID is called its tail
number). There is a partial order (a mathematical relation) in which a point representing an arbitrary
airplane assembly is "less than" a point representing an arbitrary strut, which in turn is "less than" a point
representing a 320 strut, and this in turn is "less than" a strut for any particular tail numbered 320. This
order relation denes a specialization hierarchy: The higher you go in the order, the more specialized the
points are|the more information they contain. Conversely, lower points in the hierarchy represent higher
points that are similar in that they share some set of concepts.
The "universe" containing the points as elements is a topological space, and the lattice of open sets
(ordered by set inclusion) of the topological space corresponds to the specialization order (which goes in
the opposite direction). The logical entailment relation for the concepts corresponds directly to the subset
relation. So, for example, the concept "landing gear strut" entails the concept "airplane assembly". Cor-
respondingly, the set of all landing gear struts is a subset of the set of all airplane assemblies. Continuous
functions preserve the ordering of points and the ordering of open sets as well.
This mathematical model relates directly to the work being done in rule extraction, even with the many
dierent approaches and neural network models in use. The claim is that it supports the intuition that many
researchers in the eld seem to have about the instances of neural processing as rule instances. Another
aspect of the model is that it begins to address semiotic issues|the relationship of sign-systems (e.g.,
symbol-systems) to semantics. Finally, the topological model is consistent with probabilistic modeling and,
apparently, fuzzy logic.
Language Learning and Processing with Temporal Synchrony Variable Binding
Jamie Henderson
University of Exeter, UK, J.B.Henderson@exeter.ac.uk
Natural language, and particularly syntax, has traditionally been a bastion of symbolic processing. In
recent years statistical methods have usurped some aspects of the symbolic approach, but one aspect which
has not been successfully challenged is the use of structured representations. Thus, it still seems that the
regularities in natural language can only be captured by dividing a sentence into discrete constituents and
expressing generalizations in terms of these constituents. This poses a challenge to connectionism, but by
using Temporal Synchrony Variable Binding (TSVB), we can represent both these constituents and these
generalizations in a connectionist network.
TSVB is the method of using the synchrony of activation pulses to represent entities. This proposal was
originally made on biological grounds ([205] and see [144]), and has also been justied on computational
grounds [171]. A crucial characteristic of TSVB is that a single xed set of link weights can be applied
to multiple dynamically created entities. This characteristic allows a network's representation of syntactic
regularities to capture generalizations across syntactic constituents [79]. While the class of generalizations
that TSVB can capture is more constrained than the total set typically used in linguistic theories, they
are sucient to express the generalizations required for syntactic parsing, and these constraints even make
signicant linguistic predictions ([77], [78], [80]).
One advantage of connectionist representations over symbolic ones is that the ability to represent gen-
eralizations leads naturally to an ability to learn generalizations. For TSVB and syntactic parsing, this
potential has been realized by extending the Simple Recurrent Network (SRN) architecture [43] with TSVB,
producing an architecture we call Simple Synchrony Networks (SSNs) ([110], [81]). This architecture inherits
from SRNs the ability to learn generalizations across positions in the input sequence. In addition, SSNs can
not only represent syntactic constituency in their outputs, but they can learn generalizations across syn-
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tactic constituents. This generalization ability has been demonstrated through toy grammar experiments
[109], and through the application of SSNs to learning broad coverage syntactic parsing from a corpus of
naturally occurring text ([81], [110]). The success of these initial experiments bodes well for the future of
this architecture, both within natural language processing and for a wide range of other complex domains.
A Connectionist Theory of Learning Proportional Analogies and the Nature of
Associations Among Concepts
Nilendu G. Jani, Daniel S. Levine
University of Texas, Arlington, USA, nilendu jani@yahoo.com,b344dsl@utarlg.uta.edu
A connectionist neural network has been developed that can simulate the learning of some simple pro-
portional analogies. These analogies include, for example, a) red square: red circle :: yellow square: ????;
b) apple: red :: banana:????; c) a:b:: s: ????.
Underlying the development of our analogy network is a theory for how the brain learns that pairs of
concepts are associated in a particular manner. Traditional Hebbian learning of associations is necessary for
this process but not sucient. This is because Hebbian learning simply says, for example, that the concepts
\apple" and \red" have been associated. It does not tell us the nature of the relationship that has been
learned between \apple" and \red." The types of context-dependent interlevel connections in our network
suggest a nonlocal type of learning that in some manner involves association among more than two nodes
or neurons at once. Such connections have been called synaptic triads [40] and related to potential cell
responses in the prefrontal cortex.
Some additional types of connections are suggested by the problem of modeling analogies. These types
of connections have not yet been veried by brain imaging, but our work suggests that they may occur and,
possibly, be made and broken quickly in the course of working memory encoding. For example, we include in
our network various types of working memory connections that bear some kinship to what have been called
dierential Hebbian connections [102, 103]. In these connections, one can learn mappings between concepts
such as \keep red the same"; \change red to yellow"; \turn o red"; \turn on yellow," et cetera. Also, we
include a kind of weight transport (distantly analogous to what occurs in backpropagation networks) so that,
for example, \red to red" can be transported to a dierent instance of color, such as \yellow to yellow." (In
future modications, we may also include transport \upward" and \downward" in the network to simulate
property generalization and inheritance.)
Once a particular type of conceptual mapping has been learned between \apple" and \red" in our net-
work, for example, this mapping can be applied to the concept of \banana" to generate \yellow." The
network instantiation we are developing, based on common connectionist \building blocks" such as associa-
tive learning, competition, and adaptive resonance (see, e.g., [69, 115]), along with additional principles
suggested by analogy data, is a step toward a theory of interactions among several brain areas to develop
and learn meaningful relationships between concepts. This network is designed for a problem domain that
is based on analogies among either relatively low-level, mundane percepts or abstract categories of such
low-level percepts. Hence, at this stage it does not capture the type of high-level semantic analogies dealt
with by the models of Hummel and Holyoak [91] and Plate [149] nor the analogical ambiguities obtained
from detailed relationships among letters by the COPYCAT model of Mitchell [135]. We believe that the
general conception of our model may subsequently be extendable to such high-level or ambiguous problem
domains. However, we rst wished to capture proportional analogies among low-level concepts and percepts
by means of connectionist architectures that followed some biologically realistic principles of organization.
Grammar-based Neural Nets
Simon Lucas
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University of Essex, UK, sml@essex.ac.uk
I would suggest that most recurrent neural net architectures are not fundamentally more `neural' than
hidden Markov models - we can think of an HMM as a neural net with second-order weights and linear
activation functions.
HMMs are, of course, very much alive and kicking, and routinely successfully applied to problems in speech
and OCR for example. It might be argued that the HMMs tend to employ less distributed representations
than RNNs, but even if this is true, is it of practical signicance?
There has been some interesting work exploring the links between HMMs and RNNs [22, 18].
Also related to the discussion is the Syntactic Neural Network (SNN) - an architecture I developed in my
PhD thesis [120, 118].
The SNN is a modular architecture that is able to parse and (in some cases) infer context-free (and
therefore also regular, linear etc.) grammars.
The architecture is composed of Local Inference Machines (LIMs) that rewrite pairs of symbols. These
are then arranged in a matrix parser formation [219] to handle general context-free grammars - or we can
alter the SNN macro-structure (i.e. the way in which individual LIMs are connected together) in order to
specically deal with simpler classes of grammar such as regular, strictly-hierarchical or linear. The LIM
remains unchanged.
In my thesis I only developed a local learning rule for the strictly-hierarchical grammar, which was a
specialisation of the inside/outside algorithm [11] for training stochastic context-free grammars.
By constructing the LIMs from forward-backward modules [119] however, any SNN that you construct
automatically has an associated training algorithm. How well this works in practice has to be tested empir-
ically. I've already proven this to work for regular grammars, and work is currently in progress to test other
important cases.
What SNNs, Alpha-Nets and IOHMMs have in common is their explicit grammatical interpretation.
Having trained the `neural net', one can directly extract an equivalent grammar. This can be seen as
advantageous from a practical engineering viewpoint, but also perhaps, makes these systems a bit less
seductive from a connectionist viewpoint - one of the attractions of conventional RNNs has been their
theoretical universal computing power - though in practice I'm not aware of any convincing demonstrations
of them learning anything beyond regular languages (I would be happy to stand corrected on this point).
Representation, Reasoning and Learning with Distributed Representations
Tony Plate
Bios Group LP, USA, tplate@ibm.net
Work on higher-level connectionist processing has made steady progress over the last decade. Several
solutions to some of dicult representational problems have been developed, and researchers are starting to
build more complex systems.
There are three main problems concerning representation: binding, recursive structure, and learning.
Interesting techniques have been developed for solving all of these problems individually. However, no one
has yet built a connectionist system which can solve all of these problems at once and learn underlying
recursive structure from a raw input data stream.
Binding and Structure
There are two broad families of solutions to the problems of binding and representing recursive structure:
static conjunctive codes [84, 179, 145] , and binding by temporal synchrony [171, 91]. Both are promising and
presently have dierent strengths: conjunctive codes such as Holographic Reduced Representations (HRRs)
cope with recursive structure in a more uniform fashion, while systems based on temporal synchrony have
exhibited more advanced processing (e.g., LISA). I'll restrict my comments mainly to conjunctive codes.
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Regarding the problems of binding and structure in static distributed representations, Mitsu Hadeishi
expressed a claim that used to be widely held:
\An input space which consists of a xed number of dimensions cannot handle recursive
combinations"
A number of people have shown that it is possible to represent arbitrarily nested concepts in space with a
xed number of dimensions. Furthermore, the resulting representations have interesting and useful properties
not shared by their symbolic counterparts. Very briey, the way one can do this is by using vector-space
operations for addition and multiplication to implement the conceptual operations of forming collections and
binding concepts. For example, one can build a distributed representation for a shape conguration#33 of
\circle above triangle" as:
cong33 = vertical + circle + triangle + ontop*circle + below*triangle
where each symbol here is a vector. By using an appropriate multiplication operation (in my HRRs [145]
I used circular, or wrapped, convolution), the reduced representation of the compositional concept (e.g.,
cong33) has the same dimension as its components, and can readily be used as a component in other
higher-level relations. Decoding is accomplished easily using inverse operations. Large recursive structures
can be chunked into smaller parts so that arbitrary precision in vectors is not required. To do this requires
some additional machinery: an auto-associative clean-up memory in which all chunks and sub-chunks can be
stored. Quite a few people have devised representational schemes based on some form of conjunctive coding
(though few have used chunking), e.g., Smolensky's Tensor Products [179], Pollack's (1990) RAAMs [153],
Sperduti's (1994) LRAAMs [186], Kanerva's (1996) Binary Spatter Codes [97], and Gayler's (1998) Braid
operator [58]. Another related scheme that uses distributed representations and tensor product bindings
(but not role-ller bindings) is Halford, Wilson and Philips' STAR model [71].
Some of the useful properties of HRRs and these types of conjunctive representations in general are as
follows:
1. The reduced, distributed representation (e.g., cong33) functions like a pointer, but is more than a
mere pointer in that information about it contents is available directly without having to \follow" the
\pointer." This makes it possible to do some types processing without having to unpack the structures.
2. The vector-space similarity of representations (i.e., the dot-product) reects both supercial and struc-
tural similarity of structures.
3. There are fast, approximate, vector-space techniques for doing \structural" computations like nding
corresponding objects in two analogies, or doing structural transformations.
4. HRRs and binary spatter codes are fully distributed in the sense usefully dened by Bryan Thompson:
\the equi-presence of the encoding of an entity or compositional relation among all elements of the
representation." In HRRs everything is represented over all of the units. Suppose one has a vector
X which represents a certain structure. Then just the rst half of X will also represent that whole
structure, though it will be noisier.
5. HRRs scale well to representing large numbers of entities and relations. The vector dimensionality
required is high { in the hundreds to thousands of elements. But, HRRs have an interesting scaling
property { toy problems involving a just a couple dozen relations might require a dimensionality of
1000, but the dimensionality doesn't need to increase much (to 2 or 4 thousand) to handle problems
involving tens of thousands of relations.
The way these distributed representations work almost always involves superimposing vectors which
represent dierent concepts, e.g., dierent role ller bindings (in HRRs) or dierent propositions (in STAR,
Halford et al [71]). In this respect, the following point made by Jerry Feldman may seem puzzling:
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\Parallel Distributed Processing is a contradiction in terms. To the extent that representing
a concept involves all of the units in a system, only one concept can be active at a time."
However, while this claim is true as it stands, it is often not applicable in connectionist systems. This
is because distributed representations are usually have a high level of redundancy: all of the units may be
involved in representing a concept, but none are essential. Thus, one can easily represent more than one
concept at a time in most distributed representation schemes. Part of the beauty of distributed representa-
tions is the soft limit on the number of concepts that can be represented at once. This limit depends on the
dimensionality of the system, the redundancy in representations, the similarity structure of the concepts,
and so forth. And of course one can also have dierent modules within a system. But, the important point
here is that even within a single PDP module, one can still represent (and process) multiple concepts at
once.
Learning
Even if one has a way of constructing distributed representations of complex structures by systematic com-
position of lower level concepts, one still needs to be able to develop good distributed representations for
the lower level concepts. These representations should reect the similarity: similar concepts should be
represented by similar vectors. One method for learning such representations is Latent Semantic Analysis
(LSA) [39] , also known as Latent Semantic Indexing (LSI). LSA is a method for taking a large corpus of text
and constructing vector representations for words in such a way that similar words are represented by similar
vectors. LSA works by representing a word by its context (harkenning back to a comment made by Firth
(1957): \You shall know a word by the company it keeps"), and then reducing the dimensionality of the
context using singular value decomposition (SVD). (For those familiar with principal component analysis,
the reduction is essentially the same as PCA.) The vectors constructed by LSA can be of any size, but it
seems that moderately high dimensions work best: 100 to 300 elements. It turns out that one can do all sorts
of surprising things with these vectors. One can construct vectors which represent documents and queries by
merely summing the vectors for their words and then do information retrieval by nding the document with
a vector most similar to the vector for the query. This automatically gets around the problem of synonyms,
since synonyms tend to have similar vectors. One can do the same thing with multiple-choice tests, by
forming vectors for the question and each potential answer, and choosing the answer with the most similar
vector to the question. Landauer et al [108] describe a system built along these lines can pass rst-year
psychology exams and TOEFL tests. It is intriguing that all of these results are achieved by treating texts
as unordered bags of words { there are no complex reasoning operations involved. LSA could provide an
excellent source of representations for use in a more complex connectionist systems (using connectionist in
a very broad sense here). One attractive property of LSA is that it is fast enough that it can be used on
many tens of thousands of documents to derive vectors for many thousands of words. This is exiting because
it could allow one to start building connectionist systems which deal with full-range vocabularies and large
varied task sets (as in info. retrieval and related tasks), and which do more interesting processing than just
forming the bag-of-words content of a document a la vanilla-LSA.
Processing: Complex Reasoning
As mentioned by Ross Gayler and others, analogy processing is a very promising area for the application of
connectionist ideas. There are a few reasons for analogy being interesting: it appears to be widespread in
human cognition, structural relationships are important to the task, no explicit variables need be involved,
and rule-based reasoning can be seen as a very specialized version of the task. One very interesting model of
analogical processing with (partially) distributed representations is Hummel and Holyoak's LISA model [91].
This model uses distributed representations for roles and llers, binding them together with temporal syn-
chrony, and achieves quite impressive results. Similar models based on static conjunctive binding codes have
not yet been demonstrated, though powerful primitive operations for manipulating structures and nding
corresponding objects have been identied [146].
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The Input Space Is The Real World
George Reeke
The Rockefeller University, USA, reeke@lobimo.rockefeller.edu
Mitsu Hadeishi wrote:
\The point I am making is simply that after one has transformed the input space, two points
which begin `close together' (not innitesimally close, but just close) may end up far apart and
vice versa. The mapping can be degenerate, singular, etc. Why is the metric on the initial space,
then, so important, after all these transformations? Distance measured in the input space may
have very little correlation with distance in the output space."
I can't help stepping in with the following observation. The reason that distance in the input space
is so important is that the input space is the real world. It is generally (not always, of course) useful for
biological organisms to make similar responses to similar situations{this is what we call \generalization".
For this reason, whatever kind of representation is used, it probably should not distort the real-world metric
too much. It is perhaps too easy when thinking in terms of mathematical abstractions to forget what the
purpose of all these transformations might be.
Mitsu Hadeishi replied:
\Quite true, which is why I mentioned `not innitesimally close' since clearly the transfor-
mations need to be stable (for the most part) over small variations in the input (i.e., not have
discontinuous variations). However, it can be useful for the transformations to have `relatively
sharp' boundaries, i.e., so as to be able to discriminate categories (consider a network whose
output is deciding whether a letter presented to it is `A' or `B'|usually you would want the
output to be varying relatively sharply between the categories.)"
The idea that relatively sharp boundaries should be introduced by input space transformations as a means
of discriminating categories, and thus of dening symbols, is, in my opinion, at the heart of a fundamental
problem with the symbol-processing approach to cognition. (This is an issue for any symbol-processing
approach, not just for connectionist symbol processing, of course.) We do indeed need symbols to perform
certain higher functions that involve logic, but I do not think we use them for ordinary perceptual catego-
rization or even to dene natural language categories. In abstract symbol systems, the boundaries between
symbols are set in advance or at any rate remain xed during any one set of transactions. In human cognitive
systems, the boundaries can change according to context and can even be dierent in two consecutive sen-
tences that use the same terms. There is only minimal confusion because the world is right there to act as a
reference to disambiguate the categories via linkages detectable in perceptual mappings. This is what makes
it possible for a small set of words to cover the enormously varied set of microscopically dierent situations
that arise in the real world. It is what enables generalization to work across even rather distant categories
without inducing confusion in other circumstances where the boundaries need to be dierent. This is not
a property of the kind of mathematical transformations that Mitsu and others in this discussion have been
talking about. I claim that the kind of xed symbols needed for logical reasoning can be built \on top" of
exible perceptual categories tied to the ever-changing real world, but it is not possible to build the exible
perceptual categories \on top" of xed abstract symbols, because the glue of the distance metric in the real
world is lost in an abstract symbol system.
Gerald Edelman some time ago introduced the term \zoomability" to refer to the property by which
neural representations of the world contain at any time numerous links at multiple scales to other chunks
of the world [41]. He and I have discussed in several places [156, 42, 157] why we believe that perceptual
mappings must possess this and related properties in order to support human categorization, language, and
reasoning.
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Learning and Reasoning with Connectionist Representations
Dan Roth
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA, danr@cs.uiuc.edu
Learning and reasoning have been long recognized as fundamental phenomena of intelligence. Much
progress has been made in understanding them from a computational perspective. Unfortunately, the theories
that have emerged for the two are somewhat disparate. If one wants to develop computational models
that account for the exibility, adaptability and speed of reasoning, a central consideration is how the
knowledge is acquired and how this process, of interaction with its environment, inuences the performance
of the reasoning system. Developing a unifying theory for the Learning and Reasoning phenomena, we
believe, is currently the central theoretical question we face if we want to make signicant progress towards
understanding how the brain or a man-made machine perform knowledge intensive inferences.
An attempt to cast research in this direction as the study of symbolic processes using connectionist rep-
resentations is, we believe, misguided. It focuses the research on presenting traditionally studied knowledge
representations and inference problems using a connectionist architecture, neglecting that (1) this by itself
does not resolve the intractability of reasoning with these representations and (2) the fact that connectionist
representations are not inherently more robust than other equivalent representations; non-brittleness is a
virtue of the way representations are acquired. On the learning side, it emphasizes an unnatural separation
of learning algorithms (all function approximation algorithms) to \symbolic" and \non-symbolic".
Our work in this direction has concentrated on developing the theoretical basis within which to address
some of the obstacles and on developing an experimental paradigm within which realistic experiments (in
terms of scale and resources) can be performed to validate the theoretical basis. In particular, we have
developed a connectionist architecture and algorithmic tools that have already shown superior results on
some large-scale, real-world inference problems in the natural language domain.
The formal framework developed to address such questions is the learning to reason (L2R) approach {
an integrated theory of learning, knowledge representation and reasoning. Within L2R it is shown [100]
that through interaction with the world, the system truly gains additional reasoning power over what is
possible in the traditional setting, where the inference problem is studied independently of the knowledge
acquisition stage. In particular, cases are presented where learning to reason is feasible but either reasoning
from a given representation or learning these representations do not have ecient solutions. A suggestion
of how to use L2R within a connectionist architecture is developed in [161]. The specic implementation
used there utilizes a model-based approach to reasoning [99] and yields a network that can support instan-
taneous deduction and abduction, in cases that are intractable using other knowledge representations. This
is achieved by interpreting the connectionist architecture as encoding examples acquired via interaction with
the environment, and allows for the integration of the inference and learning processes.
This framework is being studied within Valiant's Neuroidal paradigm [203], a computational model
that is intended to be consistent with the gross biological constraints we currently understand. This is a
programmable model which makes minimal assumptions about the computing elements. It is composed of
two types of units: circuit units and image units with the intention that a network of circuit units will form
the long term memory of the system while image units can be thought of as the working memory of the
system [204]. It is equipped with on-line learning mechanisms and a decision support mechanism.
Our experimental system, SNOW, is inuenced by the Neuroidal model, and has already been shown to
perform remarkably well on several real-world natural language inferences tasks such as context sensitive
word correction (Spell), part-of-speech tagging (POS) and prepositional phrase attachment [65, 163, 106].
The SNOW (Sparse Network of Winnows) architecture is a network of threshold gates utilizing the Winnow
[117] learning algorithm as an update rule. The system consists of a very large number of items which
correspond to high-level concepts, for which humans have words, as well as lower-level predicates from which
the high-level ones are composed. Lower-level predicates encode aspects of the current state of the world,
and are input to the architecture from the outside. The high-level concepts are learned as functions of
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the lower-level predicates. When learning from text, for example, complex features of pre-dened form
(e.g., conjunctions of primitive features that appear in close proximity) that are observed in the text are
allocated nodes in the network, and learning is done in terms of these complex features. This allows one to
learn higher-than-linear representations using a learning algorithm that learns linear functions. This process
becomes feasible computationally due to modest dependence of the algorithm used on the dimensionality of
the domain. Learning in SNOW [162] proceeds in an on-line fashion, where every example (input sentence) is
treated autonomously by (possibly) many target subnetwork. For example, in Spell, target nodes represent
members of the confusion sets (e.g. fdesert ; dessertg); in POS, target nodes correspond to dierent pos tags.
An example may be treated as a positive one for a few of the nodes and negative to others. At decision time
given an input sentence which activates a subset of the input nodes, the information propagates through all
the subnetworks and a learned decision support mechanism takes aect. Winnow, a local, mistake driven
on-line learning algorithm, is used at each target node to learn its dependence on other nodes. Its key feature
is that the number of examples it requires to learn the target node grows linearly with the number of relevant
attributes and only logarithmically with the total number of attributes { allowing for a large feature set.
The system uses large text corpora to eciently learn a network architecture consisting of hundreds of
thousands of features. The learned network is able to create a useful level of knowledge and successfully per-
form several inference tasks. In this way, the system already addresses a few of the important computational
issues that arise in learning to perform large-scale language inferences. Studying the interaction between
subnetworks and devising binding mechanisms as part of a concrete implementation of the image units are
some of the issues that are currently under investigation.
Understanding how the brain can perform knowledge intensive inferences such as language understanding,
high level vision and planning and behave robustly when presented with previously unseen situations, is one
of the great intellectual problems of our time. We have argued that the key to make progress in this direction
is to develop unied theories of learning and reasoning, and reported on some theoretical progress in this
direction. As important is the development of an experimental paradigm, so that progress can be measured
using large scale experiments, with a methodology that is common in other sciences. We have presented the
SNOW system as an example for a successful system, capable of performing large real-world inferences.
SHRUTI { A Neurally Motivated Model of Rapid Relational Processing
Lokendra Shastri
1
International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, USA, shastri@icsi.berkeley.edu
In order to understand language, a hearer must draw inferences to establish referential and causal coher-
ence, generate expectations, and recognize speaker's intent. Yet we can understand language at the rate of
several hundred words per minute. This suggests that we are capable of performing a wide range of inferences
rapidly, spontaneously and without conscious eort { as though such inferences are a reex response of our
cognitive apparatus. In view of this, such reasoning may be described as reexive reasoning [171].
This remarkable human ability poses a central challenge for cognitive science and computational neu-
roscience: How can a system of simple and slow neuron-like elements represent a large body of systematic
knowledge and perform a wide range of inferences with such speed?
In 1989, V. Ajjanagadde and L. Shastri proposed a structured connectionist
2
model shruti [1], which
attempted to address this challenge and demonstrated how a network of slow neuron-like elements could en-
code a large body of structured knowledge including specic as well an instantiation independent knowledge,
and perform a variety of inferences within a few hundred milliseconds [5][170][6][165][171]. D.R. Mani made
several important contributions to the model [126] and also implemented the rst shruti simulator.
1
Research on shruti has been supported by: NSF grants SBR-9720398 and IRI 88-05465, ONR grant N00014-93-1-1149,
DoD grant MDA904-96-C-1156, ARO grants DAA29-84-9-0027 and DAAL03-89-C-0031, DFG grant Schr 275/7-1, ICSI general
funds, and subcontracts from Cognitive Technologies Inc. under ONR grant N00014-95-C-0182 and ARI contract DASW01-97-
C-0038. Work on the CM-5 version of Shruti was supported by NSF Infrastructure Grant CDA-8722788.
2
For an overview of the structured connectionist approach and its merits see [46][166]
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shruti suggested that the encoding of relational information (frames, predicates, etc.) is mediated by
neural circuits composed of focal clusters and the dynamic representation and communication of relational
instances involves the transient propagation of rhythmic activity across these clusters. A role-entity binding
is represented within this rhythmic activity by the synchronous ring of appropriate cells. Systematic
mappings | and other rule-like knowledge | are encoded by high-ecacy links that enable the propagation
of rhythmic activity across focal clusters, and a fact in long-term memory is a temporal pattern matcher
circuit that res when the static bindings it encodes match the dynamic bindings encoded in the rhythmic
activity propagating through the neural circuitry.
shruti showed that reexive reasoning can be the spontaneous and natural outcome of a neurally plausi-
ble system. In shruti there is no separate interpreter or inference mechanism that manipulates and rewrites
symbols. The network encoding of commonsense knowledge is a vivid model of the agent's environment and
when the nodes in this model are activated to reect a given state of aairs in the environment, the model
spontaneously simulates the behavior of the external world and in doing so nds coherent explanations and
makes predictions [171].
shruti also identied a number of constraints on the representation and processing of relational knowl-
edge and predicts the capacity of the dynamic memory underlying reexive reasoning. On the basis of
neurophysiological data pertaining to occurrence of synchronous activity in the  band, shruti lead to the
prediction that a large number of facts can be active simultaneously and a large number of rules can re in
parallel during an episode of reexive reasoning. However, the number of distinct entities participating as
role-llers in this activity must remain very small ( 7).
The possible role of synchronous activity in dynamic neural representations had been suggested by other
researchers (e.g., Malsburg [206]), but shruti provided a detailed account of how synchronous activation
can be harnessed to solve problems in the representation and processing of high-level (symbolic) conceptual
knowledge. Several other models that use synchrony to solve the dynamic binding problem have since been
proposed (e.g., [92][91]) and there has emerged a rich body of neurophysiological evidence suggesting that
synchronous activity might indeed play an important role in neural information processing (e.g., [178][202]).
The relevance of shruti extends beyond reasoning to other forms of rapid processing of relational in-
formation. For example, J. Henderson [77] has shown that constraints predicted by shruti explain several
properties of language processing including garden path eects and our limited ability to deal with center-
embedding.
Over the past several years, shruti has been augmented in a number of ways [168] in collaborative work
between the author, his students, and others. These enhancements enable shruti to:
1. Encode negated facts and rules and deal with inconsistent beliefs (with D.J. Grannes) [172]
2. Seek coherent explanations for observations
3. Encode soft/evidential rules and facts (with D.J. Grannes and C. Wendelken)
4. Represent types and instances, and the subtype and supertype relations in an eective manner and
support limited forms of quantication [169]
5. Instantiate entities dynamically during reasoning (with D.J. Grannes and J. Hobbs)
6. Represent multiple-consequent rules (with D.J. Grannes and C. Wendelken)
7. Exhibit priming eects (with D.J. Grannes, B. Thompson, and C. Wendelken)
8. Support context-sensitive unication of entities (with B. Thompson and C. Wendelken)
9. Tune network weights and rule-strengths via supervised learning (with D.J. Grannes, B. Thompson,
and C. Wendelken)
10. Realize control and coordination mechanisms required for encoding parameterized schemas and reactive
plans (see [173]).
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The above enhancements have been incorporated into the shruti simulator by D.J. Grannes and C.
Wendelken. In on going work, the author is working with M.S. Cohen, B. Thompson, and C. Wendelken
to augment shruti to integrate the propagation of belief with the propagation of utility. This integration
would allow shruti's sense of utility to direct its search for answers and explanations. In addition to the
developments mentioned above, V. Ajjanagadde has worked on the problem of abductive reasoning and
pursued an alternate set of representational mechanisms [3][4].
Applications
shruti (circa 1993) has been mapped onto the CM-5 by D.R. Mani [125]. The resulting system can encode
knowledge bases with over 500,000 (randomly generated) rules and facts, and yet respond to a range of
queries requiring derivations of depth ve in under 250 milliseconds. Even queries with derivation depths of
eight are answered in well under a second. The mapping of shruti onto a network/cluster of workstations
is currently under investigation.
The shruti model meshes with the NTL project at ICSI [2] on language acquisition and provides con-
nectionist solutions for several representational and computational issues arising in the project. We are also
engaged the integration of shruti and its reexive capabilities with a metacognitive (reective) component
in collaboration with B. Thompson and M.S. Cohen. The reective component is responsible for directing
the focus of attention, making and testing assumptions, identifying and responding to conicting interpre-
tations and/or goals, locating unreliable conclusions, and managing risk (see [33] and B.B. Thompson and
M.S. Cohen in this issue).
INFERNET:A Model of Deductive Reasoning
Jacques Sougne
University of Liege, Belgium, J.Sougne@ulg.ac.be
INFERNET is a model of deductive reasoning. It uses a distributed network of spiking nodes. Variable
binding is achieved by temporal synchrony. While it is not a new technique (see Grossberg & Somers [70];
Hummel & Holyoak [91]; Lisman & Idiart [116]; Luck & Vogel [121], Usher & Donnelly [202]; Shastri &
Ajjanagadde [171]), the use of distributed representation, and the way it solves the problem of multiple
instantiation is new.
INFERNET is able to deal with conditional reasoning (material implication) including negated condi-
tional [182, 180]. Here are the 16 forms:
A B, A; A B, :A; A B, B; A B, :B
A :B, A; A :B, :A; A :B, :B; A :B, B
:A B, :A; :A B, A; :A B, B; :A B, :B
:A :B, :A; :A :B, A; :A :B, :B; :A :B, B
The INFERNET simulator performance t human data which are sensitive to negation and especially to
double negations. This eect of negation is often referred as negative conclusion bias in the psychological
literature.
INFERNET has also been applied on problem requiring multiple instantiations (Sougne [183, 184, 181];
Sougne & French [185]). In INFERNET, multiple instantiation is achieved by using the neurobiological
phenomena of period doubling. Nodes pertaining to a doubly instantiated concept will sustain two oscillation.
This means that these nodes will be able to synchronize with two dierent set of nodes. This method puts
constraints on the treatment of multiple instantiation. The INFERNET simulator performance seems to t
human data for problems requiring multiple instantiation like:
Mark loves Helen and Helen loves John. Who is jealous of whom?
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Due to distributed representation, INFERNET is sensitive to similarity of the concepts used in deductive
tasks which are conrmed by empirical evidences [184, 185]). There is also an interesting eect of noise [184].
When white noise is added in the system (and if it is not too important) the performance of the system is
improved. This phenomenon is known as Stochastic resonance (Levin & Miller [114]).
Localist Connectionist Models For Symbolic Processing
Ron Sun
The University of Alabama, USA, rsun@cs.ua.edu
There has been a variety of work in developing localist connectionist models for symbolic processing,
as pointed out by messages posted on the connectionist mailing list by, e.g., Jerry Feldman and Lokendra
Shastri. Although it has been discussed somewhat, a more detailed list of work in this area is still needed.
The work in this eld spans a large spectrum of application areas in AI and cognitive science. Thus, it seems
to be reasonable and useful to summarize the work in terms of these areas.
 Reasoning, which includes work on commonsense reasoning, logic reasoning, case-based reasoning,
reasoning based on schemas (frames), and so on. In terms of commonsense reasoning, we have the
following work: Lange and Dyer [111], Shastri and Ajjanagadde [171], Sun [191], and Barnden [12].
These existing models take dierent approaches: Shastri and Ajjanagadde [171] and Sun [190] took
a logic approach, while Barnden and Srinivas [13] took a case-based reasoning approach. Lange and
Dyer [111] used reasoning based on given frames that contain world knowledge encoded in localist
connectionist networks. Lacher et al [107] implemented MYCIN type reasoning with condence factors
for expert system applications.
 Natural Language Processing, including both syntactic and semantic processing. There are many
models, including the following pieces of work: Henderson [77], Bookman [21], Regier [158], Wermter
et al [216] and Bailey et al [10].
 Learning of Symbolic Knowledge, based on rst learning in neural networks and then extracting sym-
bolic knowledge. Such work can be justied as follows: In many instances, extraction of knowledge
from neural networks is better than learning symbolic knowledge directly using symbolic algorithms,
in algorithmic/computational or cognitive modeling terms. There are voluminous publications on this.
For example, the most important pieces of work are Fu [53], Giles and Omlin [63], and Towell and
Shavlik [201]. Some of these models involve somewhat distributed representation, but that's not the
point. The point is that localist models can be trained and symbolic knowledge can be extracted from
it. See also Sun et al [194] for a model in which neural networks and extracted symbolic rules work
together to produce synergistic results.
 Recognition and Recall, including a variety of models such as Jacobs and Grainer [95, 96], Page and
Norris [139], and the now classic McClelland and Rumelhart [129].
 Memory, which is an area where many models are being developed and applied by the psychology and
cognitive science communities. See Hintzman [85] for a review.
 Skill Learning, including Sun and Peterson [195] and Sun et al [194], as well as some on-going projects
that I am personally aware of (but, unfortunately, have no publications yet).
A question that naturally arises is: why should we use connectionist models (especially localist ones) for
symbol processing, instead of symbolic models? There are so many dierent reasons. I cannot even begin to
enumerate all the rationales for using localist models for symbolic processing discussed in these afore-cited
pieces of work. These reasons may include:
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1. Localist connectionist models are an apt description framework for a variety of cognitive processing.
(See Grainger & Jacobs [68] for further information.)
2. The inherent processing characteristics of connectionist models (such as similarity-based processing,
which can also be explored in localist models) make them suitable for cognitive processing.
3. Learning processes can naturally be applied to localist models (as opposed to learning LISP code), such
as gradient descent, EM, etc. (As has been pointed out by many recently, localist models share many
features with Bayesian networks. This actually has been recognized very early on, see for example,
Sun [188, 189], in which a localist network is dened from a collection of hidden Markov models, and
the Baum-Welch algorithm was used in learning.)
Finally, here are two more more bibliographical notes.
1. Sun and Bookman [193] contains a detailed annotated bibliography on high-level connectionist models
that covers all the important work up to 1993.
2. In addition, see also the recently published edited collection, Sun and Alexandre [192], for further
information.
In sum, the eld of connectionist symbolic processing is alive and well, especially localist approaches,
which have been reviewed here. Progresses are being made steadily, albeit slowly. There are reasons to
expect further signicant progress to be made, given all the afore-mentioned reasons for such models.
Stefan Wermter
Hybrid Neural Symbolic Agent Architectures based on Neuroscience Constraints
University of Sunderland, Sunderland, UK, stefan.wermter@sunderland.ac.uk
Adaptive symbolic and neural agents have received a lot of interest for dierent tasks, for instance
speech/language integration and image/text integration [159, 155, 132, 216, 44, 220]. Hybrid neural symbolic
methods have been shown to be able to reach a level where they can actually be further developed in real-world
scenarios. A combination of symbolic and neural agents is possible in various hybrid processing architectures,
which contain both symbolic and neural agents appropriate according to a specic task, e.g. integrating
speech, text and images.
From the perspective of knowledge engineering, hybrid symbolic/neural agents are advantageous since
dierent mutually complementary properties can be combined. Symbolic agents have advantages with re-
spect to easy interpretation, explicit control, fast initial coding, dynamic variable binding and knowledge
abstraction. On the other hand, neural agents show advantages for gradual analog plausibility, learning,
robust fault-tolerant processing, and generalization to similar input. Since these advantages are mutually
complementary, a hybrid symbolic neural architecture can be useful from the perspective of knowledge
engineering if dierent processing strategies have to be supported.
A loosely coupled hybrid architecture has separate symbolic and neural agents. The control ow is se-
quential in the sense that processing has to be nished in one agent before the next agent can begin. Only
one agent is active at any time, and the communication between agents is unidirectional. An example archi-
tecture where the division of symbolic and neural work is loosely coupled has been described in a model for
structural parsing within the SCAN framework [212]. A tightly coupled hybrid architecture contains separate
symbolic and neural agents, and control and communication are via common internal data structures in
each agent. The main dierence between loosely and tightly coupled hybrid architectures is common data
structures which allow a bidirectional exchange of knowledge between two or more agents.
In an integrated hybrid architecture there is no discernible external dierence between symbolic and
neural agents, since the agents have the same interface and they are embedded in the same architecture.
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The control ow may be parallel and the communication between symbolic and neural agents is via messages.
Communication may be bidirectional between many agents, although not all possible communication channels
have to be used. One example of an integrated hybrid architecture was developed for exploring integrated
hybrid processing for spontaneous spoken language analysis [214, 217, 215].
SCREEN is an integrated architecture since it does not crucially rely on a single neural or symbolic
agent. Rather, there are many neural agents, but also some symbolic agents. They have a common interface
and they can communicate with each other in many directions. From an agent-external point of view it
does not matter whether the internal processing within an agent is neural or symbolic. This architecture
therefore exploits a full integration of symbolic and neural processing at the agent level. Furthermore, the
agents can run in parallel and produce an analysis in an incremental manner. While integrated hybrid
architectures provide the current state of the art for neural symbolic interaction [217], there is still a static
way of communication between a static number of agents. We are working towards a new dierent class of
hybrid dynamic architectures which can be used for dierent multimodal scenarios.
However, for building more sophisticated intelligent computational agents in the long run, principles
from cognitive neuroscience also have to be considered for building neural architectures which are based
more on the brain functions. For instance using whole-brain fMRI, it seems possible that activation patterns
of distributed regions in the brain serve as associative memory during visual-verbal, episodic declarative
memory tasks. Such encoding and retrieval experiments could be evidence for the impact of medial parietal
regions in storage and recall of declarative memory. Principles of neuroscience and brain function could have
an important inuence on building complexer well-grounded neural network systems, in particular for areas
like associative memory storage and retrieval, intelligent navigation, speech/language processing, or vision.
However, besides the integration of neuroscience constraints into articial neural networks it will also be
important to understand the symbolic interpretation of neural networks at higher cognitive levels since the
human real neural networks are capable of dealing with symbolic processes.
Recursive Computation in a Bounded Metric Space
Whitney Tabor
University of Connecticut, USA, tabor@cs.cornell.edu
Tony Plate's inspiring work on Holographic Reduced Representations (HRRs) [148, 145] breaks new
ground by providing a mathematically well-grounded method of encoding tree-structured objects in xed-
width vectors. Following related work by Smolensky on tensor-product representations [179], Plate's analysis
of the saturation properties of the codes helps provide new insight into the representational dierences
between standard symbolic computers and connectionist networks. But the saturation analysis speaks in
terms of typical properties of HRR vectors and does not give explicit insight into the geometric properties
of particular encodings.
A related line of work [196, 136] focuses on designing the geometry of specic trajectories of metric
space computers, including many connectionist networks. One essential idea (proposed in embryonic form
in Pollack [151, 152], Siegelmann and Sonntag [175], Wiles and Elman [218], Rodriguez, Wiles, and Elman,
to appear [160]) is to use fractals to organize recursive computations in a bounded metric space. Cris
Moore [136] provides the rst substantial development of this idea, relating it to the traditional practice
of classifying machines based on their computational power. He shows, for example, that every context
free language can be recognized by some \dynamical recognizer" that moves around on an elaborated, one-
dimensional Cantor Set. I have described a similar method which operates on high-dimensional Cantor sets
and thus leads to an especially natural implementation in neural hardware [196, 197].
This approach sheds some new light on the relationship between conventional and connectionist compu-
tation by showing how we can use the structured entities recognized by traditional computational theory
(e.g., particular context free grammars) as bearing points in navigating the larger set [136, 174] of comput-
ing devices embodied in many analog computers. A useful future project would be to to use this kind of
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computational/geometric perspective to interpret HRRs and related outer product representations.
Naturalistic Decision Making and Models of Computational Intelligence
3
Bryan B. Thompson, Marvin S. Cohen
Cognitive Technologies, Inc., USA, fbryan,mcoheng@cog-tech.com
We are working with an cognitive model of the acquisition and use of decision-making skills. It is
a naturalistic approach, which begins with the way experienced, eective decision makers actually make
decisions in real-world tasks [28],[27],[26]. The model is based on interviews with 14 tactical Naval ocers [34]
and 33 U.S. Army command sta [29]. We have found (as have others in expert-novice research) that these
ocers use methods that combine pattern recognition with strategies for eectively facilitating recognition,
verifying its results, and constructing more adequate models when recognition fails. >From this foundation,
we have developed an adaptive model of decision making that integrates recognition and metacognitive
processes. Such metacognitive processes, once acquired, may also support more rapid (reexive) explanation-
based learning of domain knowledge. We call this the Recognition / Metacognition (R/M) model [27],[34],[31].
This research combines (i) a theory of human decision making, the R/M model; (ii) empirical research
testing that model and its training implications in several domains, including tactical Navy, Army battleeld
and commercial aviation decision making [32],[31],[30],[52]; (iii) research on connectionist architectures for
model-based reinforcement learning [198],[209],[210],[211]; and (iv) development of a connectionist model for
rapid recognition-based domain reasoning (Shruti, [171],[167], which is described by Shastri elsewhere in
this survey).
We are currently engaged in computational modeling of reexive (recognitional) and reective (metacog-
nitive) behaviors. To this end, we have used a structured connectionist model of inferential long-term
memory, with good results. The reexive system is based on the Shruti model proposed by Shastri and
Ajjanagadde [171],[167]. Working with Shastri, we have extended the model to incorporate supervised learn-
ing, priming, and other features. We are currently working on an integration of belief and utility within this
model. The resulting network will be able to not only reexively construct interpretations of evidence from
its environment, but will be able to reexively plan and execute responses at multiple levels of abstraction
as well.
This reexive system, implemented with Shruti, is coupled to a metacognitive system, which is re-
sponsible for directing the focus of attention, making and testing assumptions, identifying and responding
to conicting interpretations of evidence and/or goals, locating unreliable conclusions, and managing risk.
In essence, the metacognitive system is a meta-controller that learns behaviors which manipulate the con-
text under which recognitional processing occurs. While the recognitional system uses a causal model of
the world, the metacognitive system represents the evidence-conclusion relationships, or arguments [199],
that have been instantiated in the world model during recognitional processing. That is, it has a second
order causal representation of patterns of activation in the world model. According to Pennington and
Hastie [142],[141] and others (e.g., Pearl, [140]), decision makers use causal representations when data are
voluminous, complex, and interdependent. It is no surprise that causal models are suggested at both the
recognitional and metacognitive level of analysis.
The signicance of this research lies in what it can tell us about the structure and dynamics of human
long-term memory (LTM). There is strong cognitive evidence for distinct recognitional and metacognitive
processes. In addition, there is independent evidence concerning the computational complexity of reexive
inference, as well as limits on biologically plausible computation, that constrain viable models of human
cognition. Such limits on recognitional resources necessitate adaptive attention shifting behaviors, which ex-
tend the scope of reexive inference. Complex metacognitive skills are developed from these simple attention
shifting mechanisms. Such skills provide for reasoning explicitly about uncertainty. They are used to identify
3
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(DASW01-97-C-0038)
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incomplete arguments, unreliable assumptions, and conicting goals or evidence, and then reframe the recog-
nitional problem by changing assumptions and/or the focus of attention. When stakes and time warrant
more than reexive behavior, real decision-makers use such skills to evaluate and improve interpretations
and plans.
By combining a reexive reasoner with attention shifting mechanisms, we identify systems capable of
assembling larger, coherent interpretations and plans, and of reasoning explicitly about uncertainty, rather
than simply aggregating alternative explanations. Research and experiments with the computational model,
and a wealth of empirical decision-making studies [29],[34], suggest that the development of an executive
attention function, such as the proposed metacognitive system, may be necessary for, and integral to, the
development of structured, inferential LTM. Further, these data suggest that skilled LTM, that is, expertise,
is developed through the application of such an executive attention function.
For instance, in an incident described in an interview with a tactical Navy ocer, a Libyan gunboat
turned toward a U.S. Navy cruiser in Libyan-claimed waters, and increased its speed. This stereotypical
attack pattern suggested to the ocer that the crew of the gunboat had hostile intentions. The Captain,
however, shifted his attention from the kinematic cues that had convinced the junior ocer, and as a result
identied a series of problems in the junior ocer's assessment. First, the Captain identied gaps in the
argument for hostile intent, i.e., there was no account of how the gunboat detected own ship, why own ship
was selected as a target, and why the gunboat was selected as an attack platform. As it turned out, the
gunboat was not thought to have the capability to localize the cruiser at the distance at which it had turned
toward own ship. Moreover, the gunboat already had passed closely to another U.S. ship that would have
been a more accessible and equally lucrative target. Finally, the gunboat itself was not an eective platform
against a cruiser. These considerations conicted with the original assessment of hostile intent. The Captain
proceeded to consider and evaluate assumptions that might explain the discrepant evidence (e.g., that the
gunboat had found own ship as a target of opportunity). He also attempted to construct and evaluate
a plausible story on the assumption that the gunboat did not have hostile intent. Finally, he carefully
estimated the time available before the risk from the gunboat would become unacceptable, and spent that
time examining possible explanations for the presence and behavior of the gunboat, alternatively identifying
and testing assumptions. One of the distinguishing traits of expertise is how such knowledge becomes
connected such that relevant evidence is automatically integrated and uncertainties identied. (E.g., Both
(a) \The gunboat lacked the means to localize the cruiser", and (b) \It was an ineective threat" provide
arguments against hostile-intent).
Taken together, such research and data reveal new computational forms for cognitive systems. In current
research, we are developing a new method for Approximate Dynamic Programming, termed causal-HDP.
Dynamic programming is one of the few methods available for optimizing behavior over time in stochastic
environments. Approximate solutions to Dynamic Programming, such as Heuristic Dynamic Programming
(HDP, Werbos [208],[209]) and Q-Learning (Watkins, [207]), have received a great deal of attention both
in neuro-control systems, known as Adaptive Critics, and in genetic algorithms. The basic expression of
dynamic programming is the Bellman equation [90], by which the future expected utility of present state,
and an optimal policy function (behavior), may be computed, e.g.:
J

(R(t)) = Max
u(t)
hU(t) + J

(R(t+ 1))i (1)
where J

is the cumulative expected future value, u(t) is a vector of actions at time t, where the angle
brackets denote the expected value, U is a utility function, and R(t) is the internal state of the reasoning
agent at time t. Methods such as Q-Learning, while widely used, are unable to exploit a world model. This
rather severe limitation is overcome by model-based adaptive control methods, such as HDP.
Existing methods estimate the Bellman equation by incrementally \backing-up" estimates of future re-
wards (from t+1 to time t) to revise an evaluation function. The evaluation function takes shape as the
agent repeatedly re-visits states, and is used to revise a policy function that implements the behavior of
the agent. The policy function probabilistically chooses actions that maximize expected value given the
current estimate provided by the evaluation function. As a result, the evaluation function updates slowly
and behavioral changes lag even further behind. Existing methods can easily \crystallize" on an evaluation
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function, thereby locking in a behavior. If the model or environment subsequently change, the evaluation
and policy functions often must undergo catastrophic re-learning or remain markedly sub-optimal.
Rather than directly \looking-up" the evaluation of a state within an associative memory, we are exploring
methods that reexively compute an n-step approximation of the evaluation function from the evidence
available, the current assumptions, including the focus of attention, the domain knowledge encoded in the
world model, and estimates of future expected value and prior-probability that lie beyond the scope of
reexive inference; that is, at the dynamically determined edges of the belief network. Estimates of future
value and prior-probability are associatively stored at all variables (whether simple truth values, predicates,
or consequents and antecedents of rules) in the belief network. Whenever the propagation of activation
does not reach beyond a variable (due to the dynamic limits on reexive processing), the prior-probability
(for causes) or the expected future value (for eects) substitutes for further computation. We utilize the
computational structure of causal models within Shruti to directly compute these multi-step approximations
of the Bellman equation during reexive reasoning. This approach is a hybrid between classical time-
backward dynamic programming and incremental, single-step, heuristic dynamic programming methods. It
responds immediately, and optimally, to changes in the world model as long as the relevant information lies
within the scope of reexive inference, and it performs no worse when relying on estimates not within the
current focus of attention.
This computational structure provides a principled method by which an agent may reexively evaluate
situations, plan, and take actions. The result is a new method for model-based adaptive control suitable
for high-level cognitive problems. Agents using such mechanisms (attention shifting, approximate dynamic
programming, and a structured, inferential LTM) will be able to operate at multiple levels of spatial and
temporal abstraction, resulting in non-linear increases in planning horizons. If borne out by future research,
this work will have a profound impact on how we model intelligent behavior and learning, and on what we
can hope to accomplish with such models.
The perspective that only a fully distributed representation qualies as a connectionist solution to struc-
ture is, perhaps, what warrants challenge. In this research with Shastri, we demonstrate that inferential
structure and variable binding may be addressed within a connectionist model that respects, and is moti-
vated by, cognitive, computational, and biological constraints. The brain is by no measure without internal
structure on both gross and very detailed levels. While research has yet to identify rich mechanisms for
dealing with structured representations and inference within fully distributed representations, it also has
yet to fully explore the potential of specialized and adaptive neural structures for systematic reasoning. We
suggest that there may be rich rewards in both pursuits.
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